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Generativism about memory justification is the view that memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism 
is gaining popularity, but process reliabilists tend to resist it. Process reliabilism explains the justification of beliefs 
by way of the reliability of the processes they result from. Some advocates of reliabilism deny various forms of 
generativism. Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about only the more extreme forms. I argue that an 
extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism. This result weakens a longstanding argument for 
reliabilism. 
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1. Introduction 
Generativism about memory justification is on the rise. Stated simply, it’s the view that 
memory can generate epistemic justification. Generativism is popular among so-called ‘current 
time-slice’ epistemologists, philosophers who think that just the way a subject is at a time settles 
what she is justified in believing then.1 Her past and future don’t matter. If current time-slice 
epistemology is correct, then generativism looks promising. Whenever memory plays a role in 
our having justification it must be generating justification at the time. It is not instead preserving 
past justification. 
Process reliabilists, however, tend to resist generativism. Roughly, process reliabilism 
explains the justification of beliefs in terms of the reliability of the processes they result from, 
where the reliability of a process is its tendency to produce true beliefs. Some advocates of 
 
1 Goldman (1979: 14) says he borrows ‘current time-slice’ from Robert Nozick. The phrase applies to e.g. Conee 
and Feldman (2004), McCain (2014), and Smithies (2014). 
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reliabilism deny various forms of generativism.2 Other reliabilists reject or remain neutral about 
only the more extreme forms.3  
I will argue that a most extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism. This 
discovery might be in perfect keeping with the spirit of reliabilism. Yet it weakens reliabilism’s 
standing, since it weakens a longstanding argument for reliabilism. Alvin Goldman lays out the 
argument. He (2009: 322) thinks the justificatory status of a belief ‘held at time t partly depends, 
in the general case, on what transpired in the subject’s cognitive history prior to t.’ According to 
Goldman this ‘historicity of justifiedness is a major problem’ for current time-slice views. But 
reliabilism, Goldman (1979: 14) claims, is an ‘Historical theory’ and as such it ‘makes the 
justificational status of a belief depend on its prior history.’ Reliabilism gets things right, or so 
Goldman claims.  
However, if an extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism, then reliabilism 
does not get things right. On this extreme form, memory could generate justification for any 
previously unjustified belief. Contrary to Goldman, reliabilism could ignore a belief’s past. 
Because reliabilism is sometimes oversimplified in a way that masks its relation to generativism, I 
state these views carefully (in Section 2) before arguing (in Section 3) that an extreme form of 
generativism follows from reliabilism. Then (in Section 4) I address several objections to my 
argument, objections that concern cognitive penetration, belief individuation, and reliabilism’s 
generality problem. I conclude (in Section 5) by presenting reliabilism with a dilemma. 
 
2. Reliabilism and Generativism 
Reliabilism implies that features of a process that causes a belief affect the belief’s 
justificatory status. But reliabilism does not require that a justified belief results from a plainly 
reliable process. For there is an important divide among processes that cause beliefs. Some 
 
2 See e.g. Senor (2007, 2009, 2010). 
3 Goldman (2009) and Senor (2017) reject the extreme forms. Lyons (2009) declares neutrality. Lackey (2005, 2007) 
and Michaelian (2011) endorse only non-extreme forms explicitly.  
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processes are belief-independent, yielding beliefs without taking any beliefs as inputs. A basic 
perceptual process could be belief-independent. Your visual experience of a blue sky results in 
you believing that you see something blue. It could be that the experience is part of a process 
that did not involve any of your other beliefs, and this process results in you believing that you 
see something blue. Reliabilism states that if a belief results from a reliable, belief-independent 
process, then it is justified.4 
However, other processes are belief-dependent. These processes yield beliefs in a way that 
directly depends on other beliefs. A belief-dependent process takes some beliefs as inputs. An 
inferential process is belief-dependent. It takes beliefs in premises as inputs, and it results in a 
belief in a conclusion. Memory is also belief-dependent when, for example, it preserves a belief 
over time—when it takes a belief that p at t1 as an input and results in a belief that p at t2.
5 The 
justification conditions for a belief that results from a belief-dependent process are not simple. A 
belief-dependent process may be unreliable if its input beliefs are often false (an inferential rule, 
for example, may tend to yield false conclusions, if typically applied to false premises). Yet the 
process can still have a key asset: when all its belief inputs are true, it tends to yield truths. The 
process is conditionally-reliable. And a conditionally-reliable belief-dependent process can yield a 
justified belief, provided that all belief inputs are justified. Belief in a conclusion is justified if the 
inferential process is conditionally-reliable and the beliefs in the premises are justified. 
According to reliabilism, there are no other conditions in which a belief is justified. To be 
clear, then, reliabilism states:  
 
R1.  If S’s belief that p at t results from a reliable, belief-independent process, then S’s 
belief that p is justified at t.  
R2. If S’s belief that p at t results from a belief-dependent process that is conditionally-
reliable and all belief inputs to which were justified, then S’s belief that p is justified 
at t. 
 
4 See Goldman (1979: 13).  
5 Inference and memory are Goldman’s (1979: 13) original examples of belief-dependent processes. 
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R3.  If S’s belief that p is justified at t, then it satisfies R1 or R2.6 
 
R3 is included because R1 and R2 are jointly exhaustive. On reliabilism, a belief is unjustified if it 
satisfies neither R1 nor R2.  
The literature often overlooks R2 and R3, glossing reliabilism as a biconditional 
resembling R1. That is, some philosophers suggest reliabilism makes unconditional reliability not 
just sufficient but also necessary for justification. Usually this is inconsequential. Sometimes it is 
not. John Turri (2015: 529) for example claims that ‘A consensus view in contemporary 
epistemology is that knowledge must proceed from reliable processes, abilities or dispositions.’ 
He attributes this view to reliabilists because he attributes to them the view that knowledge 
requires justified belief, which requires reliability. Turri attacks this allegedly consensus view. 
Crucially, his attack assumes that the reliability required for knowledge is unconditional. But R2 
makes clear that not even reliabilists hold that justification requires unconditional reliability—not 
even reliabilists would consent to the allegedly consensus view. 
 A statement of a generic generativism is already at hand: memory can generate 
justification. At first glance this view seems unobjectionable. After all, perception, introspection, 
intuition, etc. generate justification, and memory does not seem to have a defect these other 
faculties lack. However, on a standard folk psychological view—one that many philosophers (e.g. 
Burge 2003: 321) endorse—memory has a relevantly unique and limited function. Memory 
generally aims to preserve what it receives from these other faculties. Memory does not create 
any new information, except when it errs. So, when memory is responsible for our having 
 
6 Cf. Feldman (2003: 93) and Goldman (1979: 13-4). Lyons’ (2009: 177-8) reliabilism is more complex but relevantly 
similar. He (2009: 137) thinks the ‘all’ condition in R2 should be weaker. No careful statement of reliabilism in the 
literature departs notably from R1, R2 and R3. Goldman (1979: 14) mistakenly omits ‘belief-dependent’ from R2. 
The omission would let any belief resulting from any belief-independent process count as justified, since any belief-
independent process is (trivially) conditionally-reliable, and (trivially) all inputs to any belief-independent process are 
true. R1 and R2 do not have ‘no defeaters’ clauses, but this will not matter here—in the cases that I use to show that 
an extreme form of generativism follows from reliabilism, there are no relevant defeaters. 
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justification, memory is likely just preserving justification that derives from some other faculty. It 
is not generating new justification.  
 By slightly modifying the generic, however, we see moderate and liberal forms of 
generativism that are consistent with this folk-psychological view of memory. They limit the 
sorts of justification memory generates or the conditions in which memory generates it. Briefly 
reviewing these moderate and liberal forms will help us see what makes other forms more 
extreme. Sven Bernecker (2010: 98-9) advocates one moderate form: ‘The only way for memory 
to function as a generative source of justification is by removing defeaters and thereby 
unleashing the justificatory potential that was already present at the time the belief was initially 
entertained.’ Memory does this, he thinks, in such a case as the following. A subject has a 
justified belief that p at t1, and gains a misleading defeater for this justification at t2. As a result, at 
t2 the belief is not justified overall, but is merely prima facie justified—that is, it would be justified 
overall, in the absence of any defeater. At t3, the defeater happens to be lost. So, the belief 
becomes justified overall at t3. From t1 to t3 memory retains the belief and its prima facie 
justification, and thanks to memory the belief becomes overall justified at t3. In Bernecker’s 
examples, the defeater is lost via forgetting. So, memory stops blocking overall justification in his 
cases. Bernecker thinks memory is therefore generating overall justification. Set aside exactly how 
the defeater is lost, and Bernecker’s moderate generativism states simply that memory can 
generate overall justification for some prima facie justified beliefs.7 
Jennifer Lackey (2007: 218-9) advocates a more liberal generativism on which memory 
generates not just overall but also prima facie justification. This generation can occur when a 
subject’s ‘faculty of memory reliably stored the raw materials from his perceptual experience and 
then worked these materials into a belief state that is both prima facie and [overall] justified.’8 For 
example, a subject distractedly witnesses something, and forms a belief that p about it only later 
 
7 See Lackey (2005: 640-4) for an earlier version of this sort of case, but in which memory is not what removes the 
defeater.  
8 Cf. Locke (1971: 54). 
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on. His memory stores perceptual information supporting p and eventually generates a belief 
based on it. The belief is both prima facie and overall justified. Note, however, that this 
justification is doxastic. It is justification belonging to a doxastic attitude—in this case, belief. This 
justification is generated alongside the attitude. Prior to forming the attitude, though, the subject 
already had reason (from perception) to believe that p; the subject had propositional justification 
for believing that p. Perception, not memory, originally generated the propositional justification 
in this case. Memory generates doxastic justification here by basing belief on that propositional 
justification. Lackey’s liberal generativism, then, states just that memory can generate doxastic 
justification, prima facie and overall, when something else initially provides the propositional 
justification.9 
 Kourken Michaelian (2011: 337) endorses a generativism he calls ‘radical’. He rejects the 
folk-psychological view that memory mainly just preserves information originating elsewhere.10 
Memory does of course receive information from other faculties, but doesn’t simply store it all 
for later retrieval. Memory stores selectively and alters what it stores at several stages of 
processing. What it later yields, it reconstructs. Michaelian says that ‘memory can generate 
justification by generating a new content, along with a belief with that content,’ because the 
memory process generating the belief is reliable. When memory generates in a subject the 
justified belief that p, the subject needn’t have already had reason to believe that p, much less had 
reason that traces back to some faculty besides memory. On Michaelian’s radical generativism, 
then, memory can generate propositional and doxastic justification, prima facie and overall, when 
memory generates a new belief in new content. 
 These increasingly liberal forms of generativism help us see an extreme. A form of 
generativism could state that memory can generate justification for something other than a new 
belief in new content—for an old belief in old content, even when believing that content for the 
 
9 Cf. Michaelian (2011: 337) and Senor (2017).  
10 Cf. Frise (2018a) and Salvaggio (2018). 
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subject had been unjustified overall and not even prima facie justified. For example, suppose a 
subject forms a belief that p at t1 without any good reason, and memory keeps it. A generativism 
that is beyond radical allows her belief to become justified, somehow via memory, at t2. Since 
there is already a radical generativism in the literature, and this goes beyond it, this is: 
 
Hyperradical generativism. S’s memory can generate justification (doxastic, propositional, 
prima facie, and ultima facie) for any otherwise unjustified belief in memory.  
 
Understand this as a claim about memory’s power, not as a modal claim. Any subject’s memory 
has the power to generate justification for any originally unjustified belief her memory preserves. 
This contrasts radical generativism, which attributes justification from memory only to certain 
new beliefs. From here on I will, for simplicity, drop the parenthetical in hyperradical 
generativism about the types of justification. 
Several non-reliabilists accept the full spectrum of generativism.11 But reliabilists either 
hold back from or censure hyperradical generativism.12 Thomas Senor (2009) says that if a belief 
has been kept in memory, ‘A reliabilist will hold that [it] is justified only if the memorial process 
that maintains it is reliable and if it was justified when originally formed. To hold otherwise 
would be very much out of keeping with the spirit of reliabilism.’ Similarly, Alvin Goldman 
(2011: 259-60) says that the cognitive belief-retaining process of preservative memory ‘transmits 
a belief’s justifiedness (or unjustifiedness) from one time to a later time.’ Apparently, Senor and 
Goldman deny not only hyperradical generativism, but also the weaker thesis that there is some 
unjustified belief in someone’s memory for which memory can generate justification. And their 
reasons for denying hyperradical generativism suggest it is not merely false, but necessarily false. 
 
11 See e.g. Feldman (2005) and McGrath (2007). For discussion see Frise (2015). 
12 Lackey (2007) and Michaelian (2011), for example, are silent about hyperradical generativism. Lyons (2009: 127) 
explicitly declares neutrality on it. Goldman (2009: 327) says one particular view denying hyperradical generativism 
‘has some definite virtues’, and that ‘some form of [this view] must be right’. Senor (2009, 2010, 2017: 330-32) 
makes several claims contradicting hyperradical generativism. 
8 
 
To show that hyperradical generativism is even possibly true, given reliabilism, would be enough 
to shake up the current reliabilist order.  
 This reliabilist opposition to hyperradical generativism, I believe, traces back to the 
reliabilist thesis R2. R2 says that if a belief results from a belief-dependent process, that belief is 
justified if that process is conditionally-reliable and if all belief inputs to that process were 
justified. When memory sustains a belief that p from t1 to t2, the belief that p at t1 is itself an input 
to the belief-dependent process that maintains the belief that p at t2. If the belief that p was 
unjustified at t1, then of course not all inputs to this sustaining process are justified.
13 R2 will not 
be satisfied. So it might look like, on reliabilism, memory could preserve a positive or negative 
justificatory status from the past, but cannot generate a better one for an old belief. Hence 
reliabilists like Senor defend a so-called ‘preservationist’ view of memory justification. As Senor 
(2009) says, ‘a belief that had no justification when it was formed, has no justification to be 
preserved. According to the preservationist, then, such a belief will be unjustified when recalled 
(and, for that matter, while in memory).’ 
 Senor, Goldman, and other reliabilists might accept hyperradical generativism if it 
becomes clear they must. And if they must, I see at least three upshots. First, I will have shown 
that hyperradical generativism—an extreme and controversial thesis—follows from a popular 
theory of epistemic justification, a theory many regard as hostile to this generativism. Secondly, 
any reason to accept reliabilism is reason to accept hyperradical generativism. So there are new 
avenues for supporting this extreme and controversial thesis. And thirdly, as I explain in Section 
5, what is perhaps the oldest argument for reliabilism fails if hyperradical generativism is true. 
Reliabilism, then, is less clearly correct, as its own implications doom a traditional reliabilist 
argument. 
 
 
13 Cf. Goldberg (2010: 91): ‘The justification of memorial belief involves not just the conditional reliability of the 
process of recollection, but also the reliability of the process whereby the recalled belief was originally formed.’ 
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3. On What Follows 
I will now show that hyperradical generativism follows from reliabilism. In the section 
after, I will respond to three objections. Because I am establishing what follows from what, I 
argue by conditional proof. Assume reliabilism is true, and we can derive hyperradical 
generativism. That is: 
 
CP1.  Reliabilism is true. (Assumption) 
CP2. Reconstructive recollection is a reliable, belief-independent memory process. 
CP3.  If reliabilism is true and reconstructive recollection is a reliable, belief-
independent memory process, then S’s memory can generate justification for any 
otherwise unjustified belief in memory. 
CP4.  S’s memory can generate justification for any otherwise unjustified belief in 
memory. (CP1–CP3) 
C.  If reliabilism is true, hyperradical generativism is true. (CP1–CP4) 
 
CP4 just states hyperradical generativism. CP2 identifies a particular belief-independent memory 
process as reliable. CP3 says hyperradical generativism follows from reliabilism and CP2. In 
other words, if CP2 and CP3 are true, then reliabilism leads to hyperradical generativism. The key 
question is, then, are CP2 and CP3 true? I will argue that they are. Before this, a pair of 
clarifications.  
The first clarification is on what reconstructive recollection is: it is a normal memory 
process – not a malfunction – that results in belief about the past, or an experience often leading 
to such belief, in light of related information that is stored in memory. Michaelian (2011: 325) 
adopts an influential account of reconstruction from the psychology literature: ‘Whatever 
information was selected for representation and is still accessible is used, together with general 
knowledge, (roughly) to generate a hypothesis about what might have happened.’ Reliabilist Mary 
Salvaggio (2018: 658) describes it as ‘our memory system’s best educated guess about the past 
given the information available’. Reconstructive recollection’s primary output may be a memory 
rather than a belief. The memory commonly leads to belief sharing its content, though, and we 
can assess any of this processing that leads to belief for reliability. Although reconstructive 
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recollection is non-factive and does not aim to exactly reproduce stored information, reliabilists 
like Michaelian (2011: 329-30) and Salvaggio (2018) argue it is (conditionally) reliable, playing no 
small part in our having justification from memory. Reliabilists are divided about just how much 
memory is reconstructive, and how much is purely preservative. While reliabilists emphasize how 
reconstructive recollection leads to new belief in new content, a key point I will make is that it 
could also lead to belief in old content; it can overdetermine belief.14  
Secondly, reconstructive recollection may not be reliable in all worlds.15 The conditional 
proof shows that it follows from reliabilism that hyperradical generativism is true in any world 
where reconstructive recollection is reliable. Senor and Goldman, however, suggest hyperradical 
generativism is actually false and not even possibly true. If CP2 is possibly true, reliabilism possibly 
leads to hyperradical generativism, and that result is newsworthy enough. But I will argue that 
CP2 is in fact true. 
 To establish CP2, I will argue that reconstructive recollection is reliable, then that it is 
belief-independent, and then that it is a memory process.  
 
14 It might seem like reconstructive recollection mainly has to do with one sort of memory, while the preservationist 
view of memory (and disinclination toward generativism) has to do with another.  The first memory type is episodic. 
It is typically thought of as autobiographical and imagistic memory of experienced events. The second memory type 
is semantic. It’s typically thought of as memory for information in propositional form. Perhaps (i) episodic memory 
is often reconstructive, but semantic is not. And perhaps (ii) reliabilists are concerned simply about whether 
semantic memory generates justification. So it might seem that, (iii) whatever I show about reconstructive 
recollection, reliabilists gain no reason to waiver in loyalty to preservationism. 
  I think none of (i) – (iii) is quite right. It’s unclear where to draw the line between episodic and semantic memory, 
much less where to locate reconstructive recollection in that distinction. But rather than argue this I will focus on 
(ii). It is not semantic memory alone that is of proper concern to reliabilists. Reliabilism has to do with the processes 
that cause a subject to have a belief. And episodic memory, by causing recollection of an event, can cause belief. 
And it can cause not just belief in new content, but also in content previously believed. Further, note that reliabilists 
like Lackey (2005) and Michaelian (2011) have used episodic memory to motivate their versions of generativism. 
And other reliabilists, like Senor (2007), oppose even this. And note some reliabilists remarks about memory’s 
preservative justificatory power have implications for whether any kind of memory could generate justification. For 
example, as mentioned above, Goldman (2011: 259-60) says preservative memory transmits unjustifiedness. If he is 
right, it follows that episodic memory cannot generate justification for an otherwise unjustified belief. And for 
example, Senor’s (2009) remark above places conditions on justification from memory such that it follows that 
episodic memory cannot generate justification for an otherwise unjustified belief. So, (ii) is incorrect; reliabilism 
must square with how even episodic memory generates justification. It follows that (iii) is incorrect; the generative 
powers of reconstructive recollection, even in episodic memory, could challenge preservationism. I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for calling for clarification here.  
15 On most but not all accounts, reliability can vary across worlds; see Frise (2018b) for discussion. 
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Reconstructive recollection is at least contingently reliable. Beliefs resulting from it tend 
to be true. They are true far more often than they are false. So reconstructive recollection is at 
least contingently reliable. As noted, some reliabilists already argue as much. I submit reliabilists 
have special reason to agree. Although Michaelian (2011) is silent about hyperradical 
generativism, he does argue that reliabilism entails radical generativism; on reliabilism, memory 
can (and does) generate new justified beliefs in new content.16 Whatever memory process 
produces a new justified belief with new content p, it obviously does not take an old belief that p 
as an input. Yet it is reconstructive and reliable. But, as I make clear below, precisely this sort of 
process can lead to belief that p even if there is antecedent belief that p. The reconstructive 
process relevant to hyperradical generativism is the same reliable one that leads to radical 
generativism. It is plausible that reconstructive recollection is reliable, given radical generativism. 
 Some reconstructive recollection is belief-independent. This may seem incorrect, because 
some reconstructive recollection is obviously belief-dependent. Sometimes, a subject 
reconstructively recollects that p, and some belief—perhaps even her past belief that p—is an 
input to this recollection process. She reconstructively recollects that p in part because she believed 
it in the past. But it would be a mistake to conclude that no process type can have both belief-
independent and belief-dependent tokens. Whenever a process has belief inputs, it is belief-
dependent. Whenever it has no belief inputs, it is belief-independent. And it is plausible, 
especially in light of cognitive psychological research, that some reconstructive recollection has 
or easily could have no belief inputs.17 Memory is normally generative with respect to content. 
Ordinarily, the content of recollection is something memory assembles from various sources. 
Several potential sources lie in the circumstance in which the subject retrieves information from 
memory. The particular cue that initiates retrieval, the subject’s recent thoughts, and the amount 
and kind of information retrieved, for example, standardly affect the content of recollection. 
 
16 Cf. Salvaggio (2018: 658), who thinks the general reliability of memory counts towards the justification of ‘newly 
constructed memory contents’. 
17 For an overview of the relevant research, see Michaelian (2011) and Frise (2018a).  
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These sorts of factors can, in ordinary circumstances, result in a subject recollecting that p, 
independently of the subject already believing that p or believing anything else. Even when a subject 
who believes p recollects that p in part because she bears a relation to a mental representation 
that p, it may not be a believing relation that contributes to the recollection (past imagining might 
cause the recollection instead). A subject’s past belief that p need not be an input to her present 
reconstructive recollection that p. 
 Finally, reconstructive recollection is a memory process. If there is purely preservative 
recollection, it is of course a memory process. If reconstructive recollection is not a memory 
process, there must be some relevant difference between preservative and reconstructive 
recollection. And there is no relevant difference.  
But perhaps it seems otherwise. Perhaps preservative recollection is factive—you can 
recollect only what is true. And reconstructive recollection is non-factive. But this is a nonstarter. 
In the literature it is at best controversial that preservative recollection is factive. More 
importantly, since it is already plausible that there are justified false memory beliefs, the non-
factivity of reconstructive recollection should not disqualify it from being a memory process.  
Here is another potentially relevant difference. It might appear that any memory process 
has a suitable causal connection to the past, and that preservative recollection has such a 
connection. Any recollecting that p is caused in part by previous learning that p or by a past 
experience in which p. But reconstructive recollection might not have such a connection. It can 
be causally isolated from any particular past learning or experience. 
 It’s not a given in the literature that reconstructive recollection lacks a causal connection. 
It might have one. And if it has a causal connection, the objection falls flat—there is no 
difference between preservative and reconstructive recollection here. At any rate, a causal 
condition on any recollection fits poorly with reliabilism. Reliabilists like Michaelian (2016: ch.6) 
argue at length specifically against it. Moreover, naturalistically-oriented reliabilists like Goldman 
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(1979: 13), Michaelian, and Salvaggio (2018) individuate processes psychologically and 
functionally, without reference to the past.18 Memory processing is picked out by the operative 
mechanisms within the individual at the time. And preservative recollection and reconstructive 
recollection in fact depend on either relevantly similar or perhaps even identical networks of 
brain regions. If we count preservative recollection but not reconstructive recollection as a 
memory process, we insist from the armchair on a substantive view about what memory is and 
how it works. And we don’t carve nature at its joints. Reliabilists will excuse themselves from the 
table. 
 There is no relevant difference between preservative recollection and reconstructive 
recollection. Reconstructive recollection is a memory process, and it is reliable and belief-
independent. This establishes CP2. 
 Now I will argue for CP3, the claim that if reliabilism is true and reconstructive 
recollection is a reliable belief-independent memory process, then hyperradical generativism is 
true. Recall that reliabilism states two sufficient conditions for justified belief (R1 and R2), and 
an exhaustivity clause saying these conditions together tell the complete story (R3). According to 
R1, if a belief that p results from any reliable belief-independent process—memory or 
otherwise—then the belief is justified. My defense of the previous premise, CP2, shows that 
beliefs from belief-independent reconstructive recollection satisfy the antecedent of R1. So, 
given R1, memory can generate justification for any belief, even for a belief that memory is 
retaining and that is otherwise unjustified. That is, CP3: given reliabilism and the status of 
reconstructive recollection, hyperradical generativism is true.  
Let’s see this more concretely. Without good reason, Rico formed a belief that p at t1. His 
belief is unjustified then. Memory retains this belief up through t2, but by t2 Rico has forgotten 
how his belief came about. In fact if it came to mind, it would seem to him as innocent as any of 
 
18 Cf. Fernández (2018). 
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his other beliefs. So Rico believes that p at t2 because memory retains it from t1. But also at t2, 
Rico reconstructively recollects that p. This particular reconstructive recollection is belief-
independent—none of Rico’s beliefs, not even his past belief that p, contributed to it. So, as a 
result of reconstructively recollecting that p, Rico believes that p at t2. Memory is also retaining 
his belief that p from t1. Memory overdetermines his believing that p at t2. Still, if reliabilism is 
true, then memory generates justification for an otherwise unjustified belief in memory. 
Belief overdetermination of this sort is possible on more than one theory of belief. 
Suppose dispositionalism is true: a subject believes that p iff she has a suitable set of dispositions 
toward p. Reconstructive recollection could overdetermine belief by overdetermining that the 
subject has a particular suitable set or by causing her to have a second suitable set. Suppose 
instead representationalism is true: believing is a matter of bearing a certain relation to a mental 
representation. Reconstructive recollection could overdetermine that the subject bears that 
relation. 
The overdetermined belief could have any content within the limits of what’s 
psychologically possible for the subject to believe via memory. Process types aren’t individuated 
by belief output content. As with any other process, there’s no special limit to what 
reconstructive recollection might yield belief in. The output belief is justified on reliabilism if 
reconstructive recollection is reliable. Of course, the subject could have a defeater for the belief, 
in which case the justification is prima facie but not overall. A defeater may be especially easily 
acquired when the belief has a certain type of content—such as an apparent contradiction or 
apparently necessary falsehood. But the subject may also have a defeater for any defeater (e.g. 
reason to believe any contradiction here is merely apparent). In that case, the belief is justified 
overall. Memory has the power to generate justification of any sort, for any otherwise unjustified 
belief. At any rate, any constraints on the justification memory can generate are simply those 
shared with other justificatory sources; there is no special limit to memory’s justificatory power. 
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The reader might have noticed that the antecedent of R2, reliabilism’s second sufficient 
condition for justified belief, isn’t satisfied in a case like Rico’s. It’s not the case that a reliable 
belief-dependent process, with all justified belief inputs, is causing Rico to believe that p—Rico’s 
past belief that p is an unjustified belief input to the belief-dependent process resulting in his 
belief that p. But it would be a mistake to conclude that, on reliabilism, this prevents memory 
from justifying Rico’s belief. Reliabilism does not require for justified belief that the antecedents 
in both R1 and R2 are satisfied. If one antecedent is satisfied, it is irrelevant that the other is not.  
This helps reveal that, on reliabilism, a belief’s past does not affect its justificatory status 
so much as some have claimed. For instance, as noted, Goldman (1979: 14) says that reliabilism 
‘makes the justificational status of a belief depend on its prior history’, and he (2011: 259-60) says 
that preservative memory ‘transmits a belief’s justifiedness (or unjustifiedness) from one time to 
a later time.’19 And fellow reliabilist Sanford Goldberg (2010: 86) concurs: ‘whether a particular 
memorial belief is justified depends, in part, on whether it was justified on acquisition.’ A main 
point of contention between reliabilists Lackey (2005, 2007) and Senor (2007) is whether 
justification and other epistemic goods are things memory cannot generate but only preserve 
from sources other than memory. Senor (2007: 204) thinks: ‘in the absence of a new source of 
justification, a memory belief is justified or known only if it was justified or known earlier’. A 
case like Rico’s shows a new source is unnecessary. Memory has a generative justificatory power 
not all reliabilists have appreciated. When memory preserves a belief that had been unjustified, it 
may prevent the satisfaction of R2’s antecedent. But preservative memory does not transmit 
unjustifiedness of a belief from the past, on reliabilism—it is not quite in virtue of preservative 
memory or a belief’s past that the belief is ever unjustified, given reliabilism. Rather, a belief is 
unjustified solely in virtue of what the present conditions are. In particular, belief is unjustified 
 
19 Cf. Senor (2009); Goldman (2009: 322) claims that the justificatory status of a belief ‘held at time t partly depends, 
in the general case, on what transpired in the subject’s cognitive history prior to t.’ For him (2009: 324), ‘what 
transpired’ includes whether the subject unjustifiedly believed that p. So it seems Goldman has somewhat 
overgeneralized about the partial dependence of a belief’s justificatory status on the past. On reliabilism, present 
cognitive operations make irrelevant—do not simply outweigh—what transpired.  
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just when neither R1’s nor R2’s antecedent is satisfied. If R1’s antecedent is satisfied—even by 
memory!—then belief is justified, regardless of what preservative memory preserves. 
 Given reliabilism, CP2, and CP3, we arrive at CP4—hyperradical generativism. The 
defense of my conditional proof is complete. If reliabilism is true, hyperradical generativism is 
true.  
In the next section I address three main worries about the conditional proof. But I 
address one worry about CP2 here, because the worry motivates a second conditional proof for 
the conclusion that, if reliabilism is true, hyperradical generativism is true. The worry: although I 
have shown that reconstructive recollection is reliable, and that it is belief-independent, I have 
not shown that it is reliable while belief-independent. It could be that, when reconstructive 
recollection lacks belief inputs, it does not tend to produce true beliefs.  
 Here are my replies. First, some reconstructive recollection is due to episodic memory 
processing. Episodic memory results roughly in the revisiting of an event in one’s past. Due to 
episodic memory, one might represent an episode that one experiences as belonging to one’s 
past. This can and does lead to belief. No one questions the reliability of this process, yet it 
appears to be belief-independent. So, reconstructive recollection due to episodic memory 
processing is enough to keep CP2. Secondly, even if reconstructive recollection were unreliable 
while belief-independent, that would only be contingently true. In worlds where belief-
independent reconstructive recollection performs better, hyperradical generativism follows from 
reliabilism. But leading reliabilists don’t think hyperradical generativism is possibly true. 
And thirdly, another conditional proof is available, and it does not require CP2. My 
original conditional proof focuses on R1 and on a belief-independent memory process: 
reconstructive recollection. Another conditional proof, however, focuses on R2 and a belief-
dependent memory process. This process could also be reconstructive recollection—again, a 
process type could have some belief-independent tokens yet some belief-dependent tokens. R2 
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states that a belief is justified if it results from a belief-dependent process that is conditionally-
reliable and all belief inputs to which were justified. Here is how memory can yield a belief 
satisfying R2, such that reliabilism leads to hyperradical generativism.  
Suppose S believes that p unjustifiedly at t1, and memory preserves this belief through t2. 
It could be that, at t2, S also believes that p on account of a reliable belief-dependent memory 
process that does not take S’s belief that p from t1 as an input. Had S not already believed that p 
at t1, memory would be generating a belief that p at t2. Memory is preserving past belief, but also 
operating causally independently in a way that would have generated belief. This overdetermining 
route to belief that p at t2 takes some beliefs, but not the belief that p from t1, as inputs. Nothing 
prevents all belief inputs of this separate route to belief that p from being justified. And there is 
no reason this route cannot be conditionally-reliable.  
After all, as Michaelian (2011: 337) noted, it is plausible that the reconstructive process 
that generates new belief in new content is reliable and conditionally-reliable. This memory 
process can result in a belief that p when it does not take a past belief that p as a belief input. It 
can result in a belief that p in the absence of a past belief that p. If that’s right, this process 
should also be able to result in belief that p even when memory preserves a past belief that p, 
independently of that belief. It can overdetermine belief that p. When it does, the past belief that 
p is not a belief input, so the truth-value of p will not affect the reconstructive process’s 
conditional reliability. So it is conditionally-reliable here if it is in cases where there is no 
antecedent belief that p. Reconstructive recollection is conditionally-reliable, and can have all 
justified belief inputs when resulting in belief that p, even when memory preserves an otherwise 
unjustified belief that p. R2 implies that a memory process can generate justification for an 
otherwise unjustified belief.20 If reliabilism is true, hyperradical generativism is true.  
 
20 Cf. Goldman (1979: 14): ‘Since a dated belief may be over-determined, it may have a number of distinct ancestral 
trees. These need not all be full of reliable or conditionally-reliable processes. But at least one ancestral tree must 
have reliable or conditionally-reliable tree throughout.’ 
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On reliabilism, a belief-independent memory process and a belief-dependent memory 
process each can generate justification for any otherwise unjustified belief.  
  
4. Objections 
 I will reply to three key objections. Each objection targets my defense of CP3, rather 
than CP3 itself. The objections also apply to my defense of the premise parallel to CP3 in my 
second conditional proof, the premise stating that if reliabilism is true and memory can yield a 
belief satisfying R2, then hyperradical generativism is true. Call this parallel premise CP3*. For 
simplicity, I will mainly discuss the defense of CP3. 
 
4.1 The Generality Problem 
 The first objection will surprise no reliabilists. The objection is that I have incorrectly 
identified the process type that, on reliabilism, is relevant for determining whether a belief is 
justified. So, my defense of CP3 does not establish that, on reliabilism, memory generates any 
justification. This objection arises on account of reliabilism’s generality problem. Whatever token 
process forms any belief is a token of countless types. Reliabilism says a justified belief results 
only from reliable or conditionally-reliable processes. But just which process type must be 
reliable or conditionally-reliable, in order for a given belief to be justified? The problem of 
answering this question is the generality problem.21  
Here is how the generality problem is relevant to my defenses of CP3. I observed that 
reconstructive recollection, a reliable memory process, can result in belief that p even when 
memory retains a belief that p that had been unjustified. But I did not show that reconstructive 
recollection is the process relevant to that belief’s justification. It could be that some other process 
is relevant. In particular, it could be that the preservative memory process that sustains belief that 
 
21 See Conee and Feldman (1998) and Feldman (1985).  
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p from the past is relevant. If so, then memory does not generate justification. The sustaining 
process provides no justification if the belief was originally unjustified, and I have not shown 
that some justifying route to the belief is relevant. 
 I will make three main responses to this objection, as well as a preliminary comment. The 
comment: reconstructive recollection is at an appropriately-selected level of generality. It isn’t 
uncharitably general or particular. Many reliabilists, at any rate, identify relevant memory 
processes that are roughly or exactly at this level (Lackey 2007: 218; Michaelian 2016: 48-51; 
Senor 2017: 328-9). 
First main response: the objection appears ad hoc. Reliabilists are content to sequester 
the generality problem when discussing moderate, liberal, and radical generativism, and when 
discussing memory’s power to preserve the justification of the beliefs it preserves. Those 
discussions feature no solution to the generality problem. It is suspicious if the absence of a 
solution blocks reliabilism only from having unwelcome implications. If my defense of CP3 is 
unsuccessful in the absence of a solution, we should be less confident about anything concerning 
memory justification that reliabilism seems to imply. 
 Secondly, there is reason to suppose that, if there is a good solution to the generality 
problem, it will allow that memory can generate justification for any otherwise unjustified belief 
in memory. This is because a good solution will allow for a similar generation of justification in 
cases similar to Rico’s, but which involve something besides memory. For example, suppose S 
forms the belief that p without justification at t1 and memory preserves this belief through t2. At 
t2, a seemingly credible person testifies to S that p. This apparently credible testimony is causally 
independent of S’s antecedent belief that p, and it independently leads S to believe that p. S’s 
belief that p at t2 is overdetermined. And apparently credible testimony is reliable. And it is 
intuitively a process relevant to justification in this case. What’s more, the fact that S already had 
believed that p doesn’t affect whether apparently credible testimony is relevant. So it appears that 
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testimony generates justification for an otherwise unjustified belief in memory. Rico’s case is 
structurally identical to this case. It just substitutes apparently credible testimony with an 
apparently credible recollective process: reconstructive recollection. Given this identical 
structure, it is plausible that the solution to the generality problem will in a uniform way identify 
processes as relevant to justification in the apparent testimony and apparent recollection cases. 
And, any subject could reconstructively recollect the content of any particular belief that was 
initially unjustified. If a subject does so, the reconstructive recollection process is relevant, and 
justifying. So, for any otherwise unjustified belief in memory, memory has the power to generate 
justification. 
 Thirdly, and crucially, the generality problem turns out to be importantly irrelevant to my 
defense of CP3, and so that defense is especially secure. To demonstrate this, I will begin by 
explaining how the generality problem is importantly relevant to my defense of CP3*. This 
defense notes that even when memory is preserving a belief that p that had been unjustified in 
the past, a conditionally-reliable belief-dependent memory process can also result in belief that p, 
and the latter process needn’t take the past belief that p as an input. Two belief-dependent 
processes can at once result in the belief that p, independently. The generality problem arises 
here, as it seems unclear which of these belief-dependent processes determines whether the 
antecedent of reliabilism’s second conditional, R2, is satisfied in this case. The belief-dependent 
process that preserves the past belief that p is potentially the relevant one, potentially preventing 
the satisfaction of R2’s antecedent. 
However, my defense of CP3 notes that a reliable belief-independent memory process can 
result in belief that p, even when memory is also preserving belief that p from the past. The 
preservative process, again, could be the one relevant to whether R2’s antecedent is satisfied. But 
it is irrelevant to whether the antecedent of the first conditional of reliabilism, R1, will be satisfied. 
R1 says that a belief is justified if it results from a reliable belief-independent process. Crucially, 
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preservative memory is belief-dependent, and so it is not even a candidate for being the relevant 
belief-independent process. Preservative memory does not compete for relevance with any 
reliable belief-independent memory process that results in belief. So, preservative memory is not 
part of a generality problem that arises for my defense of CP3. Preservative memory is irrelevant 
to whether my defense of CP3 succeeds.  
One might protest: preservative memory could still be importantly relevant. A process 
may be composite, of the form φ-ing while ψ-ing. Let φ-ing be a belief-independent memory 
process that results in belief that p, and let ψ-ing be preserving in memory a belief that p that had 
been unjustified. In a case of φ-ing where there is also ψ-ing, perhaps φ-ing is not the relevant 
belief-independent process. Rather, it is the composite. If so, then the epistemic demerits of the 
preservative memory process may render the composite unreliable, and therefore not justifying.  
It is true that a process can be composite. But if a preservative memory process is part of 
the composite, the composite is not belief-independent. Preservative memory takes the past 
belief that p as a belief input. So, any composite that a preservative memory process is a part of is 
belief-dependent. The composite φ-ing while ψ-ing, then, is ineligible to be the relevant belief-
independent process in any a case of φ-ing where there is also ψ-ing. Preservative memory is no 
threat to my defense of CP3. 
An important moral from this is: since reliabilism states two sufficient conditions for 
justified belief, in some cases reliabilism faces two instances of the generality problem. These would be cases 
in which each sufficient condition is potentially satisfied. A belief can be overdetermined due to 
its independently resulting from both a belief-independent process and a belief-dependent 
process. Since each of these processes is of countless types, each presents a distinct instance of 
the generality problem. To settle whether the overdetermined belief is justified, we need an 
account of exactly which belief-independent process is the relevant one, and exactly which belief-
dependent process is the relevant one.  
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The fact that there can be two instances of the generality problem in a single case 
matters. Preservative memory inhibits justification only if it is the relevant process that results in 
belief. Preservative memory is belief-dependent, not belief-independent. So, it could be the 
relevant belief-dependent process when such a process results in belief, but not the relevant 
belief-independent process when such a process results in belief. Since preservative memory 
cannot be the relevant belief-independent process, it cannot inhibit justification when a belief-
independent memory process results in belief—even if a belief-dependent process also results in 
belief. 
In short, the generality problem may create an opportunity to object to my defense of 
CP3, but the objection appears ad hoc, mistaken, and importantly irrelevant.  
 
4.2 Belief Individuation 
A second key objection to my defense of CP3 is this. I have proposed that memory 
overdetermines a token belief in cases like Rico’s, cases where reconstructive recollection causes 
belief that p while memory already preserves belief that p. Yet I have not ruled out an alternative 
explanation of the cases. The alternative is that memory simply creates a new token belief that 
shares the content of an old belief. Rico’s token belief b1 has the content that p, and this belief is 
unjustified in the past, at t1. Later, due to Rico’s reconstructive recollection, memory generates a 
new token belief b2 at t2 that also has the content that p. Since reconstructive recollection is 
reliable, b2 is justified by memory at t2. Memory is generating justification for a new token belief 
with the same content as an old unjustified belief. Memory is not, however, promoting an old 
token belief from unjustified to justified. Until this explanation is ruled out, there is no reason to 
suppose memory overdetermines a token belief in cases like Rico’s. So the cases do not yet 
support CP3. 
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Fortunately, reflecting further on b1 rules this explanation out. Can b1, the unjustified 
token belief from the past, still exist at t2, the time when memory generates the new and justified 
belief b2? Suppose the answer is ‘No’: b1 must cease to exist once b2 is generated. On this answer, 
memory can for some reason preserve b1 only up until it generates b2—which happens to be 
identical in content and doxastic attitude type as b1—even though the process generating b2 
functions independently of the process preserving b1. Perhaps these coincidences could be the case, 
but the ‘No’ answer says they must be the case. Such an empirical prediction is not promising, 
especially when made from the armchair. 
However, it is also implausible to answer ‘Yes’ to the question above, to suppose that b1 
can continue to exist once b2 is generated. Since b1 and b2 share content, a single subject has 
multiple token beliefs at a time (t2) with one content. Rico has multiple beliefs that p at once. 
This is implausible. What’s more, the implausibility explodes, since there would be no clear limit 
to the number of token beliefs with the same content that a single subject could have at a time. 
The subject could have a token belief that p for each independent cause of belief that p at the 
time, and there is no clear limit to the number of potential independent causes. Further, if 
reconstructive recollection can generate b2 while memory retains b1, it looks like the token 
doxastic attitudes that memory preserves do not restrict those it can generate. Reconstructive 
recollection can generate token doxastic attitudes independently of what memory retains. Given 
this independence, reconstructive recollection should easily lead to implausible combinations of 
attitudes we do not observe. Memory could at once both preserve a token belief that p and 
generate token disbelief that p via reconstructive recollection. That is, implausibly, a subject could 
simultaneously believe that p and disbelieve that p. Last, it is needlessly complex to suppose a 
subject has multiple beliefs that p at a time. A single belief at a time just as adequately explains 
the subject’s behavior, cognitive processing, and phenomenal life. So it is simpler and no less 
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explanatorily powerful to suppose the subject has at most one belief that p. For these reasons, we 
should not suppose that b1 still exists when reconstructive recollection generates b2.  
But suppose all my replies to the ‘Yes’ option are bad. Suppose a subject could have 
multiple beliefs that p at once. Suppose this could happen in a case like Rico’s. Note that this 
does not yet undermine my defense of CP3. If the belief individuation concern is to undermine 
my defense of CP3, it must posit that there are multiple beliefs that p at once in every case like 
Rico’s. It must posit that a belief cannot be overdetermined by memory as I’ve described. Yet 
there is no reason to posit this. It’s more plausible that a belief that p can be overdetermined by 
memory. And if it can, this possibility is independent of the belief’s content and bearer. It could 
happen to anyone, with any belief in memory. Overdetermined belief in a case like Rico’s is not 
impossible, and that supports CP3.  
Finally, I point out two surprising upshots of accepting the ‘Yes’ answer. First, if a 
subject can have multiple beliefs that p at once, the falsity of hyperradical generativism and the 
truth of the so-called ‘preservationist’ view of memory are far more trivial than we had supposed. 
A belief’s past does not determine whether memory can generate a justified belief with the same 
content for a subject. Memory can generate a new token belief with justification. So a slightly 
revised, and still notable, hyperradical generativism would follow from reliabilism: S’s memory 
can generate justification for believing p and a justified belief that p despite S unjustifiedly 
believing that p. 
And secondly, much theorizing in epistemology is critically underdeveloped, as it ignores 
the possibility that a subject has multiple beliefs with the same content, and multiple doxastic 
attitudes toward the same content. Most theories and cases in epistemology turn out under-
described. For example, a subject may know that p and testify that p, but may also have a belief 
that p that is unjustified, so it becomes less clear what testimony from a knower confers to a 
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hearer. A peer who disagrees with you about p may also agree about p, so the proper response to 
mere awareness of disagreement becomes less clear.  
The second key objection was that I had not ruled out the possibility that memory does 
not overdetermine belief, but rather generates a new token belief with the same content as an old 
token. It is safe to rule this possibility out, since there is no credible story of what would become 
of the old token belief, and why, if a new token were generated. 
 
4.3 Cognitive Penetration 
The final objection to my defense of CP3 concerns cognitive penetration. My defense 
involves the Rico case, in which memory preserves a belief that p that had been unjustified. It 
could be psychologically unrealistic to suppose that this past belief is ever causally isolated from 
an experience that would also result in belief that p. It could be that the past belief that p 
cognitively penetrates any relevant experience that would also result in a belief that p, including a 
reconstructive recollection that p. Any route to the current belief that p will be belief-dependent, 
taking the past unjustified belief that p as a belief input. If that’s so, then according to reliabilism 
the current belief is unjustified. I have not shown that on reliabilism memory generates 
justification for an otherwise unjustified belief, unless I rule out the possibility of such pervasive 
cognitive penetration. 
In reply, I first note that even if cognitive penetration is indeed pervasive in this way, it is 
only contingently so. Possible beings with a slightly different psychology could have recollection 
experiences that are sometimes insulated from their past beliefs. Reliabilism leads to hyperradical 
generativism for these beings, and for us in slightly different worlds. Yet, as noted, Goldman 
(2011) and Senor (2009) seem to deny that hyperradical generativism is even possibly true. 
Although such pervasive cognitive penetration could be actual, it is far from empirically 
established. Moreover, if this cognitive penetration concern threatens my defense of CP3, there 
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are devastating consequences for reliabilism. Cognitive penetration would, on reliabilism, prevent 
any learning via any faculty from ever converting an unjustified belief in memory into a justified 
belief. Even if a subject has an experience decisively establishing p, the subject’s past unjustified 
belief that p will have penetrated that experience. So, the experience may overdetermine belief, 
but the experience would always be part of a belief-dependent process with an unjustified belief 
input. The antecedents of neither R1 nor R2 could be satisfied. On reliabilism, no learning of any 
kind could convert an unjustified belief into a justified belief. Reliabilism would have an 
unacceptable consequence, if there were such pervasive cognitive penetration. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Hyperradical generativism follows from reliabilism. Even if memory preserves a belief 
that p that had been unjustified, memory can generate prima facie and ultima facie propositional 
justification for believing that p, and doxastically justified belief that p. Memory generates this 
justification when its operations result in the satisfaction of the antecedent of either R1 or R2, 
and the preservation of a previously unjustified belief need not interfere with these operations. In 
fact, reliabilism leads to hyperradical generativism not just about memory justification, but about 
any main source of justification—testimony, perception, intuition, and so. Any main source 
could sustain an otherwise unjustified belief that p while, simultaneously, independently yielding a 
belief that p that satisfies the antecedent of R1 or R2, thereby generating justification.  
Reliabilist doubters of hyperradical generativism about memory justification must pick 
their poison: embrace hyperradical generativism, renounce reliabilism, or invite incoherence. 
Reliabilists can, of course, coherently deny a thesis similar to hyperradical generativism. They can 
coherently deny that preservative memory can generate justification for an otherwise unjustified 
belief in memory. Nevertheless, reliabilism suffers simply by leading to hyperradical generativism 
(of any kind, but especially about memory justification). Hyperradical generativism greatly 
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restricts the role of the past in determining present justification. Reliabilists had lauded their 
theory for not doing precisely this, for instead explaining the alleged intuition that a belief’s 
current justificatory status generally depends on its past. If reliabilism leads to hyperradical 
generativism, it notably unmoors this status from the past, especially from the belief’s past. So 
reliabilism faces a dilemma. Either hyperradical generativism is true or false. If false, then 
reliabilism is false, since hyperradical generativism follows from reliabilism. If true, then 
reliabilism’s standing suffers, since it no longer explains an alleged intuition. Either way, 
reliabilism suffers some memory loss.22 
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